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INTRODUCTION

The American juvenile justice system's primary goal is said to be the
rehabilitation of youth, not their punishment.1 To that end, juvenile
delinquency proceedings are civil matters governed by a standard of
fundamental fairness. 2 But the corresponding belief that a delinquency
proceeding is less punitive than an adult criminal proceeding is frequently
untrue with regard to its impact on young immigrants.3 In fact,
immigration proceedings have a much greater scope than delinquency
proceedings. Immigration consequences affect every aspect of a child's
life and future upon removal from the United States, including
relationships with family, friends, and society at large; access to
education, employment, language, and culture; and even health and
safety.
Children are not immune to deportation by virtue of their age of
minority-rather, deportations of children are "a routine part of
immigration enforcement. ' 4 Yet existing Supreme Court precedent does
not adequately protect noncitizen children in delinquency proceedings.
Neither the Court's 1967 decision in In re Gault granting children a
limited right to counsel in their delinquency proceedings nor the Court's
2010 mandate in Padillav. Kentucky, that adults have the right to advice
on immigration consequences, adequately ensures noncitizen children
have a fair opportunity to protect themselves from the often harsh impact
of our immigration laws.5 In particular, the Gaultright to counsel is based
on principles of due process under the Fifth Amendment, and the Court
has never expressly addressed whether due process necessarily includes
6
a right to counsel on immigration consequences of juvenile delinquency.
Further, any extension of Padilla to grant protections to noncitizen
children in juvenile delinquency proceedings represents an artificial
solution to the dilemma because the Sixth Amendment, upon which the
1. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The Challenge of Lawyering Across
Difference in Juvenile Court,62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959,970 (2010). See generally BARRY C. FELD,
BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 46-78 (1999).

2. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1967)
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile
DelinquencyRepresentation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 785 n.77 (2010).
3. See Fedders, supra note 2, at 797 n. 155.
4. David B. Thronson, A Tale of Two Systems: Juvenile Justice System Choices and Their
Impact on Young Immigrants, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 130,

133 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014).
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37, 41 (1967); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74
(2010).
6. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-50.
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Padilla decision is founded, applies only to criminal proceedings, not
civil proceedings such as juvenile delinquency. 7 Thus, whether youth
have a right to counsel on immigration consequences of their delinquency
proceedings remains an unsettled matter.
Somehow, in the wake of advocacy after Padilla,noncitizen children
have been overlooked. Many scholars have explored the right to counsel
in other contexts, scrutinizing the text in Padilla and the Court's
revolutionary decision on the right to counsel generally in Gideon v.
Wainwright to unearth implicit justifications for the possible expansion
of a right to counsel to immigration removal proceedings on behalf of
vulnerable populations, including children.8 Yet scant scholarship exists
on the expansion of the right to counsel in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, a determinate phase that often precedes immigration
removal proceedings, at least with respect to ensuring that a juvenile's
right to counsel specifically includes advice regarding immigration
consequences. As the law now stands, noncitizen children are more'
vulnerable than their adult counterparts at all stages of proceedings-in
delinquency matters and when it comes to immigration proceedings.
This disparity between the rights of noncitizen youth and noncitizen
adults is difficult to square with existing Supreme Court precedent.
Immigration laws are generally applied to children on the same terms as
to adults. 9 Although the civil label remains "firmly embedded in our
conception of removal proceedings," in reality, "the[] deprivation of
liberty from a criminal conviction can pale in comparison to the liberty
10
interest at stake in the removal proceeding that the conviction triggers."
Recently the Supreme Court has recognized the increased complexity and
severity of our deportation laws, has expounded upon its perception of
the vulnerability of noncitizens as a class, and perhaps most importantly,
has taken an increasingly progressive position with regard to the
7. See, e.g., Riya Saha Shah & Lisa S. Campbell, Ineffective Assistance and Drastic
Punishments: The Duty to Inform Juveniles of CollateralConsequences in a Post-PadillaCourt,
3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE, 163, 175-81 (2011) (noting that"[d]efendants asserting claims

for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to communicate the consequences of a juvenile
adjudication have mostly been unsuccessful," and advocating for an obligation to inform juveniles
of the same after Padilla); Fedders, supra note 2, at 803 n.168 (noting that although the Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) is often used in juvenile cases, that case nonetheless "did not discuss delinquency cases at
all"); Ellen Marrus, Effective Assistance of Counsel in the Wonderlandof "Kiddie Court" - Why
the Queen of Hearts Trumps Strickland, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 393, 409 n.96 (2003).
8. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to DeportationCounsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
ChallengingConstruction of the Fifth-and-a-HalfAmendment,58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1467-72
(2011); Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon's Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2286-87 (2013); Peter L.
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-CriminalDivide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understandingthe
Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings,43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008).
9. See infra Part 1I1; see also Thronson, supra note 4, at 135-39.
10. Markowitz, supra note 8, at 289, 294-95.
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diminished culpability and unique rehabilitative capacity of children. The
Court's recent decisions with respect to juvenile offenders align with the
philosophy of the early reformers of the juvenile delinquency system such
that the responsibilities of counsel to children in delinquency proceedings
should be at least as great as those extended to adults." In particular, the
Court has embraced studies in brain science that demonstrate that a
child's ability to understand complex laws and regulations and make
well-reasoned decisions regarding his or her actions and legal cases are
reduced as compared to those of his or her adult counterparts. The Court
also has recognized that a youth lacks control over many major outside
factors, including the family and home, which contribute to dangerous or
dysfunctional situations. 12 The lineage of precedent with respect to the
sentencing of juvenile offenders reiterates the principal justification for
the independent juvenile court system-developmental differences
between adults and children warrant a different kind of system, one that
protects the child's ability to rehabilitate fully into society.
The gap between the rights of noncitizen children and adults can be
closed by weaving together these existing threads of precedent with
another line of decisions demonstrating the Court's long-standing
perception of the protections provided by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as fluid and interdependent. The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel "has never been fully independent from due process ideas,
especially when applied to the states." 13 In 1963, the Court declared in
Gideon v. Wainwright that access to counsel in criminal proceedings is a
"fundamental right, essential to a fair trial," made obligatory on the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 The Padilla Court "acknowledged the
close connection between immigration and criminal defense" when it
established the right to counsel in adult criminal proceedings., 5 PostGideon and Padilla, the scope of defense services has expanded to
incorporate aspects of immigration law into everyday representation in
criminal court, including the plea bargaining process. 16 Thus, those first
lawyers required under Gideon are now "an essential institutional form

11. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010); Marrus, supra note 7, at 408-10.
12. Eddingsv. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,115-16 (1982); Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569-71 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2464 (2012); see also Marrus,supra note 7, at 410-15.
13. Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1470.
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-44 (1963). See also Eagly, supra note 8, at
2284-85 (discussing the expansion of the protections of Gideon in the criminal defense context
and its potential for expansion with respect to the right to appointed counsel in immigration
proceedings).
15.

Eagly, supra note 8, at 2286.

16. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384, 1388 (2012); see also Eagly, supra note 8, at
2286, 2296.
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of immigration defense."' 17 Taken together, these decisions provide wide
berth for the Court to establish a right to counsel on the immigration
consequences of juvenile delinquency that is based on the right to due
process, the constitutional guideline under which delinquency
proceedings already function.
Part I of this Article explains the history and peculiar anatomy of a
typical juvenile delinquency proceeding and discusses the potential
impacts of juvenile delinquency on immigration status. Part II examines
the evolution of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings, as well as
Supreme Court decisions that acknowledge children as a class
fundamentally different from adults, even when it comes to the most
serious offenses. Part III discusses the right of a noncitizen adult to
counsel's advice on the potential impact of criminal proceedings on
immigration status and examines the nature of the relationship between
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to
due process. Finally, Part IV advances the idea that the right to counseP'
on the immigration consequences of juvenile delinquency can and should
be derived from the Fifth Amendment right to due process.
I. Two LEGAL SYSTEMS

A. Strengths and Limitations of the Juvenile Justice System
The early reformers of the juvenile justice system in America believed
juveniles presented greater potential for rehabilitation and social
integration than their adult counterparts, and endeavored to create a more
suitable system that focused on "a sincere effort to find ways for securing
[a child's] orderly development in normal society"' 8 by "substitut[ing] a
scientific and preventative approach for the traditional punitive goals of
the criminal law."' 19 Using the legal doctrine of parens patriae, the
reformers proposed an exclusive court system for juveniles where
"professionals made discretionary, individualized treatment decisions,"20
and pushed to classify juvenile delinquency proceedings as a civil system
youth the
to advance rehabilitation-centered principles and to spare 2the
1
stigma of involvement in the adult criminal justice system.
17.

Eagly, supra note 8, at 2294.

18.

Jane Addams, Introduction, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT: A GROUP OF
PAPERS 1, 2 (reprinted 1970) (1925).
19. FELD, supra note 1, at 62.
20. Rebecca J. Gannon, Note, Apprendi After Miller and Graham, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 347,
350 (2013) (describing parenspatriaeas "the right and responsibility of the state to substitute its
own control over children for that of the natural parents when the latter appeared unable or
unwilling to meet their responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for the community").
21. Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17(1967); see also Jay D. Blitzman, Gault's Promise, 9 BARRY
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Decades later, the Supreme Court has maintained a corresponding
belief that a juvenile's delinquent "conduct is not deemed so
22
blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him or others."
Today, the Supreme Court continues to conceptualize juvenile
proceedings as "fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial,"
although modem juvenile delinquency proceedings often are a peculiar
blend of formalities and informalities
and vary considerably across
23
jurisdictions and individual cases.
States define "juvenile" for purposes of juvenile court eligibility
differently: for example, the maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction in
some states is age 18; for others, it is age 16 or 17.24 The caseload in
juvenile courts across the United States is substantial: the Department of
Justice reported that approximately one million youth under age 18 were
arrested last year. 25 The Justice Department asserts that most often,
juveniles enter the juvenile justice system "through law enforcement (i.e.,
arrest)," impliedly suggesting that other children may enter the system
without an arrest or detention (or at least without an arrest or detention
that was reported).2 6 With regard to a demographical breakdown,
although the Department of Justice has begun to track statistics related to
the race and gender of juvenile offenders, data with respect to the
nationality or citizenship status of arrested juveniles is not readily
available. However, other figures from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) regarding immigrants to the United States signal the
potentially great number of noncitizen children who may be impacted by
juvenile delinquency proceedings. For example, in fiscal year 2014 youth
age 19 or under constituted about 22% of all permanent immigration to
L. REV. 67, 75 (2007); Justin Witkin, Note, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional
Status of Minors, 47 FLA. L. REV. 113, 129 n.131 (1995) ("A majority of the states provide by
statute for the 'best interest of the child' standard.").
22. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971).
23. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984). See generally Steven A. Drizin & Greg
Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Groundfor Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV.
257, 265-66 (2007) (highlighting a myriad of procedural deficiencies in juvenile court and noting
that in the context of the "best interests" paradigm, "due process protections ... have failed to
protect juveniles from arbitrary and capricious decision-making"); Mae C. Quinn, The Other
"MissouriModel": Systemic Juvenile Injustice in the Show-Me State, 78 MO. L. REV. 1193 (2013)
(describing both the innovative and outdated qualities of Missouri's juvenile justice system).
24.

See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 21: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 8

(2016).
25.

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

JUVENILE ARREST RATE TRENDS, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR Display.asp?ID=qa
05200 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
26. Id. The U.S. Justice Department cites the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Report for its statistics on "juvenile arrests," explaining that "law enforcement statistics
are used as a proxy for examining trends in juvenile crime and offending" and that "[l]aw
enforcement provides 'input' for the rest of the juvenile justice system." Id.
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the United States. 27 DHS statistics on age are not divided with reference
to age 18; rather, immigrant youth in these categories are divided into
five groups: under 1 year, 1 to 4 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 to 14 years, and
28
15 to 19 years; or into two groups: under 16 years, and 16 to 20 years.
Closer inspection of these reports show that a substantial number of
children under age 16 (156,946), including 143,758 children aged 14 or
under, and 86,513 under age 10, immigrated lawfully to the United States
in fiscal year 2014.29 Tens of thousands of unaccompanied children also
arrive in the United States each year without authorization-an estimated
68,000 in fiscal year 2014 and 40,000 in fiscal year 2015.30 Furthermore,
the State Department estimates that thousands of individuals are
trafficked into the United States each year, figures that are even more
difficult to track precisely. 3 1 In total, recent studies suggest that
children are present in the United States
approximately 1.5 million
32
without authorization.
Each of the foregoing statistics represents children who are not yet
U.S. citizens and who are therefore susceptible to removal, regardless of
whether they initially entered with lawful status or currently maintain
some other form of lawful noncitizen status. 33 Each point of contact a
noncitizen child has with law enforcement in the juvenile system triggers
34
potentially devastating consequences for his or her immigration status.
Finally, a child's admissions of facts that might constitute a crime or
statements with respect to immigration status itself could be used to place
27.

OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK'

OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS
%202014%20Yearbook.pdf.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR

2015 CBP BORDER SECURITY REPORT 1 (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/CBPFY 15BorderSecurityReport- 12-21 0.pdf.
31.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE

LITERATURE 4 (2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/human-trafficking-and-within-unitedstates-review-literature#Trafficking; see also Thronson, supra note 4.
32.

JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN

THE UNITED STATES ii (2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/a-portrait-of-unautho

rized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/.
33.

Thronson, supra note 4, at 132.

34. As a threshold matter, most jurisdictions allow for the transfer of juveniles to adult
criminal court for certain types of cases, a process that may be automatic pursuant to operation of
statute or by election of the prosecutor, or the result of a discretionary decision by the juvenile
court to waive its jurisdiction in a particular case. See Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Waiver
to Adult CriminalCourts, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 381, 382-83 (2001). This article addresses
only the impact of juvenile offenses that are prosecuted and resolved in the civil juvenile
delinquency system, not those in the criminaladult system. Proceedings in the latter system would
ostensibly activate Sixth Amendment protections.
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a juvenile in a priority category for removal. State authorities who come
into contact with a noncitizen child accused of a juvenile offense
frequently contact Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials
and share information about the child with them, or even permit ICE
agents to question the child directly about her status without the presence
of counsel.35 For example, a recent study by the University of CaliformiaIrvine in Orange County, California, revealed that in 2011 alone, the
Orange County Probation Department-in direct violation of state
confidentiality laws-referred approximately 170 youth to immigration
authorities. 36 In 2015, the state of California recognized these problems
through the passage of AB 899, which limits the sharing of juvenile
records with ICE. In fact, the legislative language specifically cites the
compelling interest of "promoting rehabilitation" of youth in keeping
state juvenile records away from federal officials. However, even AB 899
allows for disclosure by the juvenile judge upon petition by ICE, and
moreover, most states have no similar protection from federal demands
37
for a child's records.
Typically, a juvenile delinquency matter is initiated by a referral from
a member of law enforcement to the Court or the prosecutor's office. 38 A
court intake officer or a prosecutor assigned to the juvenile docket may
informally meet with the child before any charges are filed to confront
him with the accusation and possibly take some ameliorative action
without filing formal charges. 39 While these quasi-judicial or
35.

Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportationwith Inadequate Due Process: The

DevastatingConsequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcementfor Immigrant Youth,

3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 65 (2011); see also Olga Velez, Liberty andJustice ForAll:
The Violations of Basic Human Rights in Detention Centers Across the United States, 25 U. FLA

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 187, 188 (2014) (stating that immigrants are given no rights to an attorney).
36. See VICTORIA ANDERSON ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL.-IRVINE SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS CLINIC, SECOND CHANCES FOR ALL: WHY ORANGE COUNTY PROBATION SHOULD STOP
CHOOSING DEPORTATION OVER REHABILITATION FOR IMMIGRANT YOUTH 4 (Annie Lai & Sameer

Ashar eds., 2013), http://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/UCILawSecond
Chances dec2013.pdf.
37.

1d; see, e.g.,

JUVENILE LAW CTR.,

FAILED

POLICIES,

FORFEITED FUTURES: A

NATIONWIDE SCORECARD ON JUVENILE RECORDS 6 (2014), http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenile
records/documents/publications/scorecard.pdf; RYA SAHA SHAH & LAUREN FINE, JUVENILE LAW
CTR., JUVENILE RECORDS: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF STATE LAWS ON CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING

AND EXPUNGEMENT 13 (2014),
publications/national-review.pdf.

http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/

38. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ACCESS TO COUNSEL 2 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/204063.pdf, see also
Marrus, supra note 7, at 413 n. 113.
39. See generally A.B.A. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
COURT PROCEEDINGS, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminal
justice/PublicDocuments/JJStandards Pretrial Court Proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(last

visited Feb. 23, 2016) [hereinafter STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS]; see
also Marrus, supra note 7, at 413-14.

7
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extrajudicial efforts ultimately may avoid a formal adjudicative phase
before a judge, they nonetheless may have great implications for future
immigration matters. 40 In particular, a child may make admissions or
concessions to damaging facts or accept formal adjudications indicating
41
guilt without meaningfully exploring the strength of her defense.
Indeed, in the absence of formal juvenile proceedings, the child likely
will not have the benefit of the presence of counsel, and due to reasons
such as a lack of maturity or an inability to understand legal rights and
concepts, during interrogation children regularly omit important
information, give incriminating statements, and even make false
confessions. 42 In general, when it comes to the child's willingness to
answer questions and successfully advocate on her own behalf, studies
show that juveniles are "more compliant and suggestible" and may fail to
appreciate the true impact of a legal proceeding. 43 A child's diminished
ability to "withstand intimidation"44 contributes to an increased likelihood
of confessions-even false ones.
More formal delinquency proceedings begin when the prosecuting
office files a petition with the juvenile court, which essentially indicts the
child and initiates an adjudicative phase that concludes with the entry of
a decision by a judge with respect to the child's culpability. 45 During
formal proceedings, the youth may regard all parties involved-judge,
court staff, caseworkers, police, prosecutor, parents, and even her own
lawyer-as fungible authority figures who she must obey. 46 Perhaps as a
function of that power imbalance, juvenile courts see very high plea
rates-recent studies suggest over 95% of juvenile delinquency
proceedings are resolved with a plea of guilty or responsible. 7 For those
40.
41.
42.

See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 278.
See Marrus, supra note 7, at 413-14; Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 270-75.
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011) (holding that age should be

taken into consideration in determining whether a child felt he was in "custody" for purposes of
the validity of a Miranda waiver); see also Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 259-60, 270-92.
43. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 260; see also Gannon, supra note 20, at 373-74.
44. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 269-70.
45. STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39; see also
Marrus, supra note 7.
46. Jahaan Shaheed, The "Amorphous Reasonable Attorney" Standard: A Checklist
Approach to Ineffective Counsel in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 911 (2011); see
also Birckhead, supra note I (discussing the undermining impact of the culture of prosecutors in
juvenile court in ensuring rigorous advocacy on behalf of children); Fedders, supranote 2, at 80002 (discussing "the trouble with parents").
47. Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency - Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J.

FAM. L. 629, 639 n.58 (1995) (noting that "over 95 percent [of juveniles in delinquency
proceedings] confessed or pleaded guilty"); see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical
Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1898 (1996)
("[C]ourts accept pleas of guilty in the vast majority of juvenile delinquency cases.").
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children whose cases are not resolved by plea, judges are the factfinders,
as children in delinquency proceedings do not have a constitutional right
to a jury trial.48 Studies have shown that "juries are more likely to acquit
than are judges," demonstrating that bench trials further contribute
to a
49
high rate of conviction for juveniles in delinquency matters.
The rehabilitative origins of the juvenile system contribute to a
likelihood that the interested participants in a youth's juvenile
proceedings (i.e., judge and court staff, probation officers, prosecutor and
law enforcement officials, and even the child's defense counsel and
parents) will not necessarily be propelled by a concern to ensure the
child's legal rights are protected, but instead by a focus on the child's
future and rehabilitation. 50 In fact, the child's culpability is often
collectively assumed at the outset.51 Only recently has zealous advocacy
become an expectation in juvenile court: the American Bar Association
published standards in 1980 that explicitly demanded as much from
defense counsel representing juveniles. 52 Even after these standards were
established, "[m]any juvenile courts continue to view zealous advocacy
[by defense counsel] as 'antithetical to rehabilitation."' 53 In fact, defense
counsel may find herself unwittingly relaxing her commitment to
advocacy in the juvenile context in many ways; for example, by
discussing plea agreements with parents and judges before discussing
with her client.54 Even committed defense counsel face hurdles in
48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e
conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional
requirement."); see also Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 302-03.
49. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 303 (quoting Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 245 (1984)); Welch v.

United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J., dissenting).
50. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1127-30 (1991)

("[T]rials in juvenile court are frequently 'only marginally contested,' marked by 'lackadaisical
defense efforts."' (footnote omitted)).
51. See id. at 1127; see also Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 292.
52.

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ACCESS TO COUNSEL 1 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/204063.pdf; A.B.A. INST.

1(1980), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/JJ StandardsAdjudic

OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION

ation.pdf, A.B.A. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION 43 (1980),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocumen
ts/JJStandards Prosecution.pdf; see also Birckhead, supra note 1, at 967.
53.

Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and CollateralRelief, 64

ME. L. REV. 553, 557 (2012); Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 291; see also Shaheed, supra
note 46, at 909; Birckhead, supra note 1, at 967-68.
54. See Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of
Holistic Representationfor ChildrenAccused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 323, 325 (2003); see
also Birckhead, supra note 1, at 967-68; Tepfer & Nirider, supra note 53, at 557; Caterina
DiTraglia, The Worst of Both Worlds: Defending Children in Juvenile Court,63 Mo. L. REV. 477,
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effective representation of their child clients-studies indicate that many
children do not even know what an attorney is or does. 55 Juveniles also
often do not understand a right (such as the right to remain silent) to be
an entitlement that cannot be taken away, instead thinking of a right as
something they simply are "allowed" to do by authority figures. 56 Finally,
well-intentioned parents seeking to teach their child accountability for his
or her actions may facilitate and encourage the child's admissions to
conduct or discourage the child from seeking the independent advice of
57
counsel, damaging the child's position in the defense at the get-go.
Finally, as a whole, children are "less competent trial 58defendants" and
thus are "at special risk of being wrongfully convicted.,
Put another way, due to the child's age, vulnerability, and immaturity,
the parties may focus on improving a child's situation and steering her or
him away from future misconduct, rather than ensuring constitutional
rights are protected during the court process. 59 Thus in many respects, the
very principles of rehabilitation and reintegration upon which the juvenile
system rest disincentivize the parties from ensuring a child's rights are
protected to the same degree as an adult.
B. Real Consequences of Juvenile Delinquencyfor Noncitizens
The predominant principles of rehabilitation and reintegration that
undergird the juvenile justice system simply do not carry over to
immigration law. As this section explains, acts of juvenile delinquency
can and do render noncitizens ineligible to obtain immigration status or
remain in the United States. Children are not immune to deportation by
virtue of their age of minority-rather, deportations of children are "a
routine part of immigration enforcement." 60 Significantly, noncitizens
(including noncitizen youth) have no statutory right to counsel at
government expense in immigration removal proceedings. 6 ' This reality
must be considered in evaluating potential consequences of juvenile
481-83 (1998) (discussing means for defense attorneys to provide satisfactory advocacy within
the culture and framework of juvenile proceedings); Theodore McMillian & Dorothy McMurtry,
The Role of the Defense Lawyer in Juvenile Court- Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 561, 563 (1970).
55. Thomas Grisso, The Competence ofAdolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 9-10 (1997); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-InducedConfessions: Risk Factorsand
Recommendations, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 8 (2009).
56. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 269.
57. Fedders, supra note 2, at 788-90; Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 313.
58. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 259-60.
59. See Ainsworth, supra note 50, at 1127 ("[T]rials in juvenile court are frequently 'only
marginally contested,' marked by 'lackadaisical defense efforts."' (footnote omitted)).
60. Thronson, supranote 4.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); Frankel, supra note 35, at 66.
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delinquency.6 2 In particular, if a noncitizen child (or his or her parent,
assuming one is available to assist) does not obtain counsel at his or her
own expense in immigration proceedings, the ability to mitigate the
impact of any juvenile record on immigration status is gravely crippled.63
In other words, in the current state of the law, a noncitizen child has no
right to counsel with respect to the operation of immigration laws, starting
from the delinquency proceeding all the way through a later or
simultaneous appearance before the immigration court or agency.
Some case law has developed to offset potentially catastrophic results
of the immigration laws on youth with prior delinquencies. 64 Generally,
juvenile adjudications are not considered "convictions" for purposes of
the immigration laws. 65 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
reasoned in In re Devison-Charlesthat because "[t]he [Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act] makes it clear that a juvenile delinquency proceeding
results in the adjudication of a status rather than conviction for a crime,"
juvenile delinquency acts "are not crimes" and "findings of juvenile
delinquency are not convictions for immigration purposes." 6 6 The BIA
reasoned that "juvenile delinquency [adjudications] are not criminal
proceedings, but are adjudications that are civil in nature." 67 The BIA's
decision in Devison-Charles is a corollary to its earlier holding in In re
M-U- that an admission to what would have been a juvenile offense under
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) is not an admission to a
crime, but instead "an admission of juvenile delinquency for which [a
68
noncitizen] would not be deportable."
Even if Devison and M-U- provide some degree of protection to a
62.

See generally J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2015); Frankel,

supra note 35, at 96-107 (arguing in favor of a due process right to counsel for children in
immigration proceedings).
63. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 96-97.
64. See, e.g.,
In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (B.I.A. 2000); In re M-U-, 2 I.
& N. Dec. 92 (B.I.A. 1944).
65. Devison-Charles,22 I. & N. Dec. at 1365.

66.

Id.at 1365-66.

67.
68.

Id. at 1366.
M-U-, 2 1. & N. Dec. 92, at 93. The BIA stated in Devison-Charlesthat "the standards

established by Congress, as embodied in the [FJDA], govern whether an offense is to be
considered an act of delinquency or a crime" in a particular case. Devison-Charles, 22 1. & N.
Dec. 1362, at 1366. Although many practitioners reflexively believe that this rule and the

corresponding rule set forth in M-U- cover all acts of juvenile delinquency, the substantive
provision of the FJDA purporting to explain which specific offenses will be construed as adult

offenses is a labyrinth of statutory language, setting forth conditions and contingencies based on
many factors, including but not limited to the nature of the offense, the juvenile's criminal record,
her family situation and education, and the level of her participation or leadership in the criminal
activity. This fact-intensive query mandated by the FJDA in myriad circumstances is a
discretionary and case-specific determination that the application of the FJDA in this context
contains an impossibly ambiguous dimension and blurs the bright line rules advanced by the BIA.

IT'S NOT (FUNDAMENFALL Y) I;A/i?

child in a particular circumstance, they simply do not neutralize all the
immigration ineligibility rules that apply to children. Determining the
exact reach of the immigration consequences of a juvenile transgression
requires an investigation into all applicable statutes, regulations, case law,
and even other legal resources such as official memoranda and policy
manuals to just begin to understand the terms of art contained in each.6 9
As a threshold matter, the categories of ineligibility for relief have
continued to expand steadily since the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) in 1952.70 Eligibility for relief also depends on the
specific type of benefit sought, the time at which the relief is sought, and
the illegal conduct at issue. The relevant conduct is not necessarily
limited to what transpired in court; in addition to the impact of formal
court judgments, embedded in the INA are ineligibility grounds based on
mere admissions to criminal conduct and even situations where the
officer only has a "reason to believe" criminal activity may have
occurred. 7 1

Firstly, to obtain relief, the immigration laws draw a sharp distinction
between noncitizens who entered with the government's advance
permission, who may become "deportable," and those who entered
without permission, and thus are "inadmissible." 72 Although
deportability tends to be a more forgiving standard in consideration of the
noncitizen's prior lawful admission, as this Part will show, it contains
provisions that render one deportable, which would not necessarily render
one inadmissible. Without advocacy by an effective attorney, the juvenile
that could give rise to a basis for ineligibility
record may contain facts
73
provision.
under either
A noncitizen with a single conviction for, or who makes an admission
to facts "which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving
moral turpitude" (CIMT), a violation of a law "relating to" a controlled
substance, or convictions for two or more offenses for which the total
74
sentence to confinement was five years or more, is inadmissible.
69.

See Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of Advisal Duties under Padilla, 33

CARDOZO L. REv. 549, 569 (2011).
70. Cdsar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Hernindez, CriminalDefense after Padilla v. Kentucky, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 482 (2012) (discussing in detail how the categories of ineligibility for
relief have expanded).
71.

See Inadmissible Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. 2013); Deportable Aliens,

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012); Statute for Requirements of Naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1427; Statute
for Adjustment of Status of Nonimmigrant to that of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence,
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); Statute for Adjustment of Status, Cancellation of Removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), (a)(2)(B). The term "conviction" has a very broad
definition in the immigration context, including essentially any finding by a court of culpability,
in conjunction with some type of restraint on the person's liberty, such as probation, detention, or
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Although Devison and M-U- may apply where a formal adjudication or
admission exists, another ground of inadmissibility renders a noncitizen
inadmissible for suspicion of drug-related activity. 7 5 In particular, any
individual who the federal government "knows or has reason to believe"
is or was "an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance," or who
assisted with such activities, is inadmissible. 76 Likewise, anyone who is
the spouse, son, or daughter of a trafficker who has within the preceding
five years "obtained any.., benefit" from such illicit activity "and knew
or reasonably should have known" the benefit was the product of illicit
drug trafficking is inadmissible--even if she never participated in any
trafficking herself.77 Similarly, a history of or intent to engage in
prostitution will also render one inadmissible with or without a criminal
record.78 Again, because no criminal conviction is necessarily required
for inadmissibility based on a drug-related offense, or prostitution-related
intent or conduct, a child's statements in a meeting without a lawyer
before a law enforcement or court officer, or during court-ordered
rehabilitative treatment or therapy, could easily trigger a child's
inadmissibility.
In general, deportability requires a conviction-an admission or
suspicion is insufficient to remove an individual who was lawfully
admitted. A conviction for some crimes involving moral turpitude
(punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer and committed
within five years of admission), convictions for two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude at any time, a conviction for a domestic
violence offense or a violation of a personal protection order, a conviction
for an "aggravated felony," or a conviction for an offense "relating to a
controlled substance" render a noncitizen deportable. 79 However, again,
even without a conviction, the law with respect to drug use in particular
is expansive: anyone (including children) who is or was "a drug abuser
80
or addict" after his or her admission to the United States is deportable.
Advocacy by an effective attorney could ensure the juvenile record does
jail. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2012). Convictions for purposes of immigration laws include

deferred adjudications, no contest pleas, and convictions with delayed sentences. Id. "Moral
turpitude" is a "notoriously imprecise definition" that requires a case-by-case inquiry whether the
proscribed conduct is "inherently base, vile, or depraved." Hernndez, supra note 70, at 506-07.
In practice, this definition is hard to pin down: some courts apply the definition broadly, finding

that a CIMT includes offenses ranging anywhere from petty theft to rape, while other courts have
held that crimes as serious as rape and manslaughter do not involve moral turpitude.
75. 8 U.S.C. § I I82(a)(2)(C); In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (B.I.A. 2000);
In re M-U-, 2 1. & N. Dec. 92 (B.I.A. 1944).

76.

8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(2)(C)(i).

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii).
Id. § 1182(a)(2)(D).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
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not contain facts that could give rise to a finding of deportability under
this provision.
The statutory exceptions to and waivers of inadmissibility and
deportability are narrowly written and available only for select offenses
and if certain additional conditions are met. For example, a statutory
exception to inadmissibility exists for a CIMT committed before age 18
only if it occurred at least five years before the date of the request for
admission.81 This exception applies only to the CIMT grounds of
inadmissibility and only for one offense, not several. 82 A discretionary
statutory waiver of inadmissibility, available on the same terms and
conditions to adults and children and again only for specific offenses,
requires a demonstration of additional factors-depending on the
particular grounds sought to be waived, the person may have to show he
is "rehabilitated," that 15 years or more have passed, or that "extreme
hardship" would result to his or her U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter. 83 Finally, although other"
statutory provisions in the INA allow for the inapplicability of certain
inimigration ineligibility grounds and provide waivers for individuals on
the basis of one's particular immigration classification, these allowances
are limited to classification and thus are not available to all children
seeking to avoid removal from the United States. 84 A juvenile defense
attorney versed in even basic immigration law could not only ensure the
child can preserve her right to take advantage of the general statutory
protections, but perhaps even identify potential immigration relief not
previously known to the child.
The dizzying milieu of exceptions, waivers, and statutory rules
ensconced in the INA does not end there. Other forms of immigration
relief do not utilize the standards of admissibility or deportability as a
benchmark. For example, a noncitizen who applies for asylum does not
yet have to prove he is admissible, but rather must show he has not been
convicted of "a particularly serious crime." 85 Alas, the phrase
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii).
82. Id. This specific statutory exception was not addressed by the Board in Devison and MU- and thus appears to be a supplement to the protections provided by those cases. See In re
Devison-Charles, 221. & N. Dec. 1362 (B.I.A. 2000); In re M-U-, 21. & N. Dec. 92 (B.I.A. 1944).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). With respect to drug offenses, the waiver is available for only "a

single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana," provided the remaining
requirements are met. Id.
84. See id. § 11 82(a)(9)(C)(iii) (admissibility waivers for relief under the Violence Against
Women Act); id. § 1182(d)(14) (admissibility waivers for U and T visas); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)

(2012) (admissibility waivers related to special immigrant juvenile status for abused, abandoned,
or neglected children).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). If the applicant is granted asylum, he will later
need to apply to adjust his status to permanent residency, which requires a demonstration of
admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
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"particularly serious crimes" is not defined by the INA-like a CIMT, it
requires a case-by-case determination. 86 Naturalization-the process of
becoming a citizen after the requisite period of time as a permanent
resident-requires a showing of "good moral character" (GMC). 7 The
INA does not have a GMC checklist; rather, it defines GMC in the
negative, providing a non-exhaustive list of all the ways in which one
may lack GMC, incorporating and extending beyond the standards of
inadmissibility or deportability.88 The inexhaustibility of this list of bad
character traits necessarily implies a broad power of discretion held by
the particular officer making a determination about GMC in a case.
Other forms of relief incorporate and then build off of the existing
norm of inadmissibility: for example, cancellation of removal requires an
inquiry into inadmissibility, deportability, good moral character and
discretion, and the law with respect to establishing eligibility for Family
Unity benefits incorporates both inadmissibility and deportability
standards as well as adding for a felony, three misdemeanors, particular
serious crime, and "aliens who have committed acts of juvenile
delinquency
which if committed by an adult would be a felony involving
89
violence."
Finally, noncitizen youth seeking Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), a form of executive action that offers a temporary
reprieve from removal for individuals who arrived in the United States as
children before a certain date, must not have been convicted of a
"significant misdemeanor," three or more misdemeanors, or a felony. 90 A
significant misdemeanor was defined in subsequent memoranda to
91
include all domestic violence offenses and even drunk driving offenses.
Again, the discretionary power possessed by the immigration officer is
nearly limitless: in fact, DACA itself is an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, such that noncitizens have no statutory entitlement to be
granted DACA--or even appeal its denial--even if they are otherwise

86.
87.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).

88.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012).

89.

8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2012); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S

FIELD MANUAL 24.4, https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/O-0-0-1/0-0-011139/0-0-0-11314.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
90. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s I-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-indivi
duals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf;

U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Frequently

Asked Questions on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals V, http://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivas-process/frequenty-asked-questio
ns#criminal convictions (last updated June 15, 2015) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
91. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 90.
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92

technically eligible.
Indeed, "[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad
discretion exercised by immigration officials" and this great discretionary
93
power functions only to restrict, not expand, any waiver of ineligibility.
The significance of the fact that discretion in the immigration context can
only be used to deny an otherwise approvable application, but cannot be
used to replace a missing element, cannot be overstated.94 Pursuant to
several restructures of immigration law in the 1990s, judicial review of
most discretionary agency decisions is precluded. 95 The presumptions of
the adult players in the juvenile court with regard to the child's
culpability, and the parties' efforts to teach an errant child by promoting
responsibility in a non-adversarial setting, may wreak havoc on the
child's immigration case. In an update to its Policy Manual released just
prior to publication of this Article, USCIS stated: "[F]indings of juvenile
delinquency may [] be part of a discretionary analysis. USCIS will
consider findings of juvenile delinquency on a case-by-case basis based"
on the totality of the evidence to determine whether a favorable exercise
of discretion is warranted. 9 6 Thus, even if the BIA's holdings in Devison
and M- U- provide technical protections in an individual case, without the
assistance of competent counsel during the juvenile proceeding, the
noncitizen child's eligibility for relief may be either frustrated or wholly
precluded on myriad levels.

II. SUPREME

COURT JURISPRUDENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS
OF YOUNG OFFENDERS

Since Gideon, the states have been required, pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment, to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant accused of a

92. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 90.
93. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012); Daniel Kanstroom, The Better
Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the 'Rule' of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 161, 167 (2007).
94. For a brief discussion of several arguments in favor of expanding discretion to include
the discretion not to deport, see Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: CrimmigrationLaw and the Perils
of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1744 (2011).
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012) (no court has jurisdiction to review final orders of removal
based on most criminal offenses, discretionary waivers of inadmissibility grounds, and various

forms of relief including cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, and
other discretionary relief other than asylum); see also Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formulafor
JudicialReview: The Law-Fact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 57 (2010); Kanstroom, supra note 93, at 162-63.
96. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Policy
Manual, Chapter 7-Special Immigrant Juveniles, https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/
PolicyManual-Volume7-PartF-Chapter7.html, last accessed Nov. 5, 2016.
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felony. 9 7 In 1972, the Court in Argersinger extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanors, to the extent the potential
for imprisonment exists. 9 8 These cases, which arose in the Florida state
courts, made the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
proceedings obligatory on the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The right to counsel with respect to civil
juvenile proceedings necessarily proceeded within the limits of due
process, outside the rules of criminal procedure and the Sixth
Amendment, aspiring to a system that spared the youth the stigma of
99
involvement in the adult criminal justice system.
However, over time, the efforts of the early progressive child
advocates to promote rehabilitative ideals-irrespective of the rules of
criminal procedure-resulted in a juvenile system that often handed
down severe sanctions to children without regard to constitutional
standards.' 00 The U.S. Supreme Court responded to such alarming trends
with its momentous decision in In re Gault, where it held that youth in
civil delinquency proceedings retain important constitutional rights,
including the right to counsel. 10' Since Gault,the Court has continued to
ensure juveniles retain some basic constitutional rights held by adults
while also repeatedly acknowledging that cognitive differences between
children and adults justify disparate treatment. 10 2 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has created two distinct yet important threads of
jurisprudence: one that seeks to ensure juvenile proceedings are infused
with constitutional protections extended to adults, and another that
aspires to account for the relationship between psychological
development and criminal responsibility. The Court's language in these
cases strongly suggests that the right to counsel for children is in fact
more robust than that extended to adults in criminal proceedings.
A. The Due ProcessRight to Counsel in In re Gault
The In re Gault case began with a citizen's complaint that 15-year-old

97.
98.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30, 37 (1972).

99. See Gannon, supra note 20 (describing parens patriae as "the right and responsibility
of the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the natural parents when the latter
appeared unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for
the community").
100. See Birckhead, supra note 1, at 970-71.
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,36, 41 (1967); see also Barry C. Feld, The Transformationof
the Juvenile Court -Part II: Race and the "CrackDown" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REv. 327,
349 (1999).

102. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984) (upholding a preventative detention
statute for delinquents).
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Gerald Gault had made a harassing phone call.' 0 3 Gerald was promptly
taken into custody by Arizona law enforcement officials without any
notification to his parents.' 0 4 The following day, Gerald was brought for
questioning before the state juvenile judge, and after a second hearing 6
days later, the judge adjudicated him guilty-without any witnesses or
counsel present-and sentenced him to juvenile hall until he was 21 years

of age. 105
Upon review of the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision affirming
the juvenile judge's order, the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that "[t]he
essential difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case' 10is6
that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case."
The Court admonished that "the condition of being a boy does not justify
a kangaroo court" and declared that "[a] proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the
loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution."' 1 7 The Supreme Court in Gault ultimately held that
although a juvenile delinquency hearing need not "conform with all of
the requirements of a criminal trial," it "must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment," taking note of the early reformers'
rehabilitative objectives and of sociologists' findings that "' [u]nless
appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has
violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may
therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."" 0 ' Thus the
Court tasked itself with determining "the precise impact of the due
process requirement upon proceedings by which a determination is made
as to whether a juvenile is 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct
the consequence that he may be committed to a state
on his part, 10with
9
institution."'
The Supreme Court looked skeptically at many of "the claimed
benefits of the juvenile process," for example, observing that labeling the
proceedings as "delinquency" rather than "criminal" had evolved to be a
rather meaningless distinction."10 In fact, the Court mused, the term
delinquent "has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term
'criminal' applied to adults."'. The Court viewed the punishment meted
out in a juvenile delinquency proceeding as very real-in the case before
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id.at 5-7.
Id. at 29.
Id. at28, 36.
Id. at26, 30.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at21-24.
Id. at 23-24.
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it, a "boy [] charged with misconduct" in delinquency proceedings faced
a reality that was disturbingly criminal upon confinement to an
institution:
His world becomes "a 'building with whitewashed walls,
regimented routine and institutional hours... . "' Instead of mother

and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his
world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and
"delinquents" confined12with him for anything from waywardness
to rape and homicide.1
Asserting that "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a
result of such tremendous consequences ...without effective assistance
of counsel," the Court echoed its prior decision in Kent v. United States,
wherein it had cautioned against "procedural arbitrariness" in the juvenile
courts in addressing
waivers by the juvenile court to the adult court of
11 3
jurisdiction.
In deciding what protections to issue in Gault, the Court considered
the published findings and recommendations regarding the importance of
assistance of counsel in juvenile proceedings by the President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, the Children's Bureau
of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. 114 The assistance of counsel,
the Court agreed, is "essential for the determination of delinquency"
which "carr[ies] with it the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state
institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21. " 15 The Court
observed:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him."' 16

Specifically, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment right to
due process:
requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
112.

Id. at 27.

113.
114.

Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966)).
Id. at 22, 38-40.

115.

Id. at 36-37.

116.

Id. at36.
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which may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be
notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained
by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
be appointed to represent the child.117
In addition to the right to counsel, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment also extends other procedural protections to children in
juvenile proceedings, including the right to notice of charges, the right to
of witnesses, and the privilege
confrontation and cross-examination
118
against self-incrimination.
The tone of the Gault opinion suggests the outcome was driven by a
concern about the unfettered power wielded by the juvenile delinquency
courts. However, the decision nonetheless declined to resolve a number
of other important due process questions. First, when it came to rule on
whether juveniles had a right to appeal a juvenile court order or the right'
to a transcript of the proceedings, the Court demurred, stating that such
ruling was unnecessary because reversal in Gerald Gault's case was
warranted for other reasons.'1 19 And even though the Court had identified'
that any claim that juvenile proceedings are confidential is "more rhetoric
did not require the sealing of
than reality," the Court in Gault12ultimately
0
records of juvenile proceedings.
The Gault Court likewise kept the reigns pulled taught with respect to
the limitations of the right to counsel extended by its holding, explicitly
stating that its holding did not address "the entire process relating to
juvenile 'delinquents."'121 Rather, the opinion stressed that due process
attached only to "the proceedings by which a determination is made as to
whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on
his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state

117. Id. at41.
118. Id.at 33, 42-43, 55-56.
119. Id. at 57-58.
120. Id. at 24-25. See Ashley Nellis, Addressing the Collateral Consequences of
Convictionsfor Young Offenders, CHAMPION, 22 n.25 (2011) (explaining that whether a juvenile

record is sealed off from access by the general public is a matter that varies from state to state,
and even when juvenile records expungement is available, over half of the states set forth
exceptions for certain offenses); SHAH & FINE, supra note 37; Kevin Lapp, Databasing
Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 195 (2015) (discussing erosion over time of "confidentiality
provisions" ofjuvenile records and explaining the breadth of information accessible to the public

on juveniles prosecuted in adult court). Additionally, although juveniles are entitled to the trial
standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" after the Court's decision in In re Winship in 1970,
one year later the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania held that fundamental fairness does not
require a state to provide juveniles with the right to ajury trial. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
121. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
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institution."122 In other words, Gault's holding did not address the rights
applicable to "pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process" such as a bail
hearing or arraignment, nor did it cast rules for the post-adjudicative or
dispositional processes, such as sentencing or other post-conviction
actions. 123 Gault also did not discuss the issue of the appropriate
orientation for the defense attorney in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding-namely, whether counsel's performance should be
adversarial and rights-centered or whether the attorney should adopt a
more holistic approach aligned with the original ideological principles of
juvenile proceedings. 124 Although the American Bar Association later
spelled out standards mandating zealous advocacy by defense counsel in
juvenile proceedings, the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance on
this point perhaps contributes to the existing reality that many juvenile
courts still openly disfavor zealous advocacy in the rehabilitative
proceedings. 125 Lastly, the Gaultopinion makes an abbreviated reference
to "the emotional and psychological attitude of the juveniles," but lacks
any meaningful discussion of the developmental and cognitive
differences in children as a basis for extending certain procedural
26
protections to children as a matter of due process. 1
B. Developmental Differences Justify Increased
ConstitutionalProtections
"The push for procedural due process" launched by Gault and its
progeny may have later "triggered a backlash against the juvenile court"
that ultimately "open[ed] the door for a wave of so-called reforms" to the
treatment of juveniles that "further blurred the distinction between
juvenile and adult court proceedings.' 121 Some of these changes ran
counter to the intitial reformers' intent. An era "driven by fears of a 'new
breed of juvenile superpredator"' invited the public's demand for greater
accountability for certain offenses committed by juveniles, and in the
1980s and 1990s, Congress and many state legislatures expanded the
jurisdictional reach of adult criminal courts for juveniles who committed
certain offenses and created mandatory detention and sentencing
schemes. 128 But interestingly, at the same time the Court began to steadily
122.
123.

Id.(emphasis added).
Id.

124. Fedders, supra note 2, at 786.
125. See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism,and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and
the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 246 (2005);
Shaheed, supra note 46, at 908-09; Tepfer & Nirider, supranote 53, at 557-58; Birckhead, supra

note 1, at 967.
126.
127.
128.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 26-27; see Fedders, supra note 2, at 785.
Drizin & Luloff, supra note 23, at 264-65.
Terry A. Maroney, The Once andFutureJuvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR
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develop a body of precedent that incrementally increased constitutional
protections to youth in the adult criminal justice system. 129 This later line
of precedent reflects an enduring belief, shared by the early reformers,
that systemic modifications 1 are
justified by real cognitive differences
30
between children and adults.
As the Court remarked in Eddings v. Oklahoma in 1982, "youth is
more than a chronological fact., 131 Rather, "[i]t is a time and condition
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage."' 32 Referring to psychological research showing
that brain development is not complete in those under age 18, the Eddings
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited mandatory death sentences in homicide
cases perpetrated by minors. 133 The Court observed that "minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible
than adults" and took special care to note that the young man before the
Court "was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been deprived of the care,
concern, and paternal attention that children deserve." 134 In remanding
the matter to the state court to "consider all relevant mitigating evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances[,]"
the Eddings Court averred that all of these factors must "be duly
considered" in assessing whether the death135
penalty is warranted in a
particular case involving a juvenile offender.
Two decades later and for essentially these same reasons, in Roper v.
Simmons the Court would hold that the Eighth Amendment demands that
offending youth be entirely spared the death penalty. 136 The Roper Court,
identified three general cognitive differences between juveniles and
adults justifying its complete prohibition on capital punishment. 137 First,
the Court observed, as a group youth tend to be impetuous, immature,
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 189 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014)

(describing an era "driven by fears of a 'new breed of juvenile superpredator"'); see Drizin &
Luloff, supra note 23, at 265 (stating that Congress and state legislatures created mandatory
detention and sentencing schemes); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "'Owing to the
Extreme Youth of the Accused": The ChangingLegal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRiM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642 (2002).

129.

See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.

551, 578-79 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.

2455, 2475 (2012).
130. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68;
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
131. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
132. Id.
133. See id. at H 6.
134. Id. at 115-16.
135. Id.at 1]6-17.

136.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).

137.

Id.at 569-71.
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irresponsible, and reckless, and due to these "signature qualities,"
existing laws prohibit juveniles from "voting, serving on juries, or
marrying without parental consent." 138 Secondly, juveniles are "more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,"
in large part because children "have less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment" and they "lack the freedom that
139
adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting."'
Finally, the Court concluded that the character and personality traits of
juveniles are "not as well formed as that of an adult" such that a child's
actions are less likely to be "evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity]. ' ' 4 °
Because these qualities of youth are transient and can subside, a strong
potential for rehabilitation exists in children. 14 1 In so finding, the Court
cited studies that showed that "a relatively small proportion of
adolescents who [experiment] in risky or illegal activities develop
142
entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood.',
The Court took another progressive leap forward in 2010 when it
prohibited life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders for nonhomicide offenses. 4 3 Like Roper, the Graham v. Florida opinion took
note of the fact that "developments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds" and that children are "more capable of change than are adults,"
such that they have "diminished moral responsibility."' 144 Accordingly,
the Court in Graham determined that these distinguishing attributes of
youth diminished the legitimate penal goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation145 for imposing life without parole on
juveniles in non-homicide cases.
The following year in J.D.B. v. North Carolinathe Court cited both
Roper and Graham for their "commonsense conclusions about behavior
and perception" in children as a class to hold that age must be taken into
consideration in determining the validity of a Miranda waiver. 146 The
Court in J.D.B. noted that "these observations restate what 'any parent
138. Id. at 569-70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1972)).
139. Id. at 569 (quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, DiminishedResponsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
140. Id. at 570.

141.

See id.

142. Id. (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
143. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).

144. Id. at 68, 72.
145. Id. at 71-74.
146. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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knows'-indeed, what any person knows-about children generally,"
and that the law likewise "has historically reflected the same assumption
that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature
judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world
around them."' 147 Again the Court took note of the existing "legal
disqualifications" already placed on children, such as the ability to enter
into marriage and other contracts, which "exhibit the settled
that the differentiating characteristics of youth are
understanding
48
universal."1
In 2012, the Court took yet another bold step in the sentencing context,
holding in Miller v. Alabama that the Eighth Amendment barred
mandatory life imprisonment without parole forjuveniles who committed
any crime-even homicide offenses. 14 9 The Court held that "making
youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to the imposition of that
harshest prison sentence, . . . poses too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment," noting the "great difficulty" that had been previously
identified in Roper and Graham of "distinguishing at this early age
between 'the juvenile offender whose crimes[] reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crimes[]
reflect irreparable corruption." 150 Citing the extensive body of research
on children's diminished mental capacity that undergirded its rationale in
Eddings, Roper, and Graham,Miller requires a sentencing court, before
imposing a life sentence, "to take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them
to a lifetime in prison."'' The fact that "adolescent brain science has hit'
its stride" in the Court is further evidenced by the Court's decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana that the rule in Miller barring mandatory life
sentences without parole must be applied retroactively to juveniles whose
convictions and sentences were final even before Miller was decided.1 52
Thus, a great deal of research in the fields of social science,
neuroscience and psychology demonstrating legitimate cognitive
differences between adults and children bolstered the Court's holdings in
these cases. 153 One large scale study ofjuvenile competence to stand trial
confirms that due to developmental immaturity, many juveniles "simply
147. Id. at 273.
148. Id.
149. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
150. Id. at 2469.
151.
Id.
152. Maroney, supra note 127, at 201; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37
(2016) (retroactively applying the rule in Miller to a 70-year-old defendant who committed a
murder when he was 16 years old).
153. See Maroney, supra note 127, at 191; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2455; Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 718.
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[cannot] think like competent adult counterparts" when it comes to "highlevel cognitive tasks such as hypothetical thinking, logical reasoning,
long-range planning, and complex decision making."' i 14 Children are
impulsive, unpredictable, and sometimes incapable of providing
understandable accounts of salient facts to their counsel and other
necessary parties, contributing to negative findings of credibility and
outcomes where the child is more easily found culpable.' 55 Recent
information collected about mental illnesses, intellectual disabilities, and
the effects of substance abuse also raises concerns about the overall
competency ofjuveniles to confront accusations of delinquent or criminal
misconduct. 156 As the Roper Court recognized, a youth lacks control over
many major outside factors that contribute to dangerous or dysfunctional
situations, including his family and home situation, further diminishing
his culpability. 157 These findings, embraced by the Supreme Court,
reiterate the principal justification for the juvenile court system: children
are different. These differences justify the existence of systems and
safeguards that facilitate 58the child's ability to effectively rehabilitate and
reintegrate into society.

III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL

ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES

A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky
Jose Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over
forty years, pled guilty to three misdemeanor drug charges after his
criminal defense counsel informed him that "he did not have to worry
159
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long."'
However, Jose's attorney was wrong. These offenses mandated his
deportation. 160 Jose later appealed his conviction, asserting that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. 16 1 Ultimately, the U.S.
Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in criminal proceedings requires defense counsel to advise 162
their
noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of a conviction.
154. David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging
Issues Challengingthe Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED.

503, 521
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

(2006).
See Shaheed, supra note 46, at 907-13.
Katner, supranote 153, at 518-23.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

160.
161.

Id.
Id.

162.

Id. at 360, 374. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
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At the time of Jose's conviction, the collateral consequences doctrine
prevailed with respect to an attorney's obligation to inform his client.
Under the doctrine, a defendant must be informed of the direct
consequences of a plea, which have a "definite, immediate, and largely
automatic effect," but need not be informed of any consequences deemed
indirect or collateral, or all those "possible ancillary or consequential
results which are peculiar to the individual and which may flow from a
conviction of a plea of guilty ... .,"163 Deportation, according to the Court
before Padilla,"was not a form of criminal punishment, but164rather a civil
remedy aimed at excluding noncitizens from the country."'
The Court in Padillaapproached the matter before it carefully. The
Court framed the question as "whether, as a matter of federal law,
Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which
he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country."
The Court answered that question in the affirmative. 165 The Court
observed that while deportation is a civil matter and "is not, in a strict
sense, a criminal sanction," it is nonetheless "intimately related to the
criminal process," observing that American "law has enmeshed criminal
conviction and the penalty of deportation" for nearly one hundred years:
While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses
and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the
class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to
alleviate the harsh consequences [of deportation]. The "drastic
measure" of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for
a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes .... 166
The Court determined that "deportation is an integral part-indeed,
sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes."1 67 In
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
163. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (1973) (quoting United States
v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 920 (1971)).
164. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,1038 (1984); Yolanda Vazquez, Advising
Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical
Answer for the CriminalDefense Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 31, 38 (2010).

165. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 374.
166. Id. at 360, 365 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 364. For a thoughtful discussion on how "[the recent trend toward harsher and
more punitive ways of intermeshing immigration and criminal law represents a decision ... that
is analogous to a life sentence," without taking into consideration events and circumstances
considered in the criminal sentencing realm, see Stumpf, supra note 94, at 1709.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 27

support, the Court cited other federal court decisions acknowledging the
seriousness of deportation as a consequence of conviction, including its
own acknowledgement in INS v. St. Cyr that "[p]reserving the client's
right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client
than any potential jail sentence."' 168 In St. Cyr, decided in 2001, the Court
observed that "preserving the possibility of [discretionary relief from
deportation] would have been one of the principal benefits sought by
defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed
to trial.' ' 169 The Padilla Court also cited the Second Circuit's reasoning
in Janvier v. UnitedStates in 1992 that even if deportation itself is a civil
action, "the impact of a [criminal] conviction on a noncitizen's ability to
remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the
sentencing process-not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of
counsel's duty to provide effective representation." 170 For its part, the
Janvier court had followed the Supreme Court's logic in Fong Haw Tan
v. Phelan that "forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country"
is a drastic measure that
equates to "banishment or exile" and therefore
17 1
"penalty.'
a
indeed
is
The Padillamajority asserted that advice regarding civil deportation
consequences "isnot categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel" and thereby carefully declined the
invitation to characterize immigration consequences as collateral or
direct. 172 The majority noted that it has "never applied a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally 'reasonable professional assistance' required under
Strickland [v. Washington]" and ultimately deemed the collateral versus
direct distinction "ill-suited" to evaluating the Strickland claim before it
due to the173unique nature of deportation as "a particularly severe
'penalty."",
An effective assistance claim under Stricklandhas two elements: first,
a defendant must show that her counsel's actions fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness; next, she must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the proceeding
168. Padilla,559 U.S. at 368 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 322-23 (2001)).
169. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323.
170. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.
1986)).
171. Janvier,793 F.2d at 455 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
172. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365. Direct consequences have been defined as those that are
"immediate and automatic" as a result of a criminal conviction, while collateral consequences are
the "indirect sanctions" that result from convictions. See Michael Pinard, The Logistical and
Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the CollateralConsequences of Adjudications,
6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1111 (2006).
173. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365-66.
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would have been different.' 74 With respect to the second element,
Strickland requires a demonstration of prejudice by "showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable."' 75 Observing that "recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a
broad class of noncitizen offenders," the Padilla Court found it "'most
difficult' to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation
context." 176 The Court specifically pointed to existing norms set by the
American Bar Association, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, and the Department of Justice requiring defense attorneys to
give noncitizens advice with respect to immigration consequences in
determining what was reasonable. 177 Padillaremarked that an attorney
with even "the most rudimentary understanding" of immigration law may
be a more effective advocate for his client, and concluded that "[t]he
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation." 178 Applying its
reasoning to the facts presented, Padilla held that the first prong of the
Strickland test-whether the attorney's performance fell below
to give her client'
reasonable norms-is met if a defense attorney failed
179
deportation.
of
risk
the
regarding
appropriate advice
Conceding that immigration law is a "legal specialty of its own" in
which some attorneys may not be well-versed, the Court decided that the
precise limits of counsel's responsibilities depended on the clarity of the
consequence: in cases like Jose Padilla's, where "[t]he consequences of
Padilla's plea could easily be determined," a failure to advise a client that
deportation is mandated by the conviction falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. 80 But with respect to the "numerous [other]
situations in which the deportation consequences [.. .] are unclear or
uncertain," a much less demanding standard applies to defense counsel:
in particular, "[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward" with
regard to the immigration consequences, the defense attorney need only
charges "may carry a risk of
advise the noncitizen that pending criminal
18 1
consequences."'
adverse immigration
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Roberts and writing for the
concurrence, agreed with the majority's view on the complexity of our
immigration laws, noting in particular the problems created by:
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
Id.at 687.
Padilla,559 U.S. at 366.
Id. at 366-68.
Id.at 367.
Id.at371.
Id. at 369.
Id.
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significant variations among Circuit interpretations of federal
immigration statutes; the frequency with which immigration law
changes; different rules governing the immigration consequences
of juvenile, first-offender, and foreign convictions; and the
relationship between the "length and type of sentence" and the
determination "whether [an alien] is subject to removal, eligible

for relief from
removal, or qualified to become a naturalized
182
citizen[.]',
The concurring opinion also agreed that "any competent criminal
defense attorney should appreciate the extraordinary importance that the
risk of removal might have in the client's determination whether to enter
a guilty plea."' 8 3 The concurring Justices argued "incompetent advice
distorts the defendant's decisionmaking process and seems to call the
184
fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into question."'
When a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on counsel's
misadvice, the Court reasoned, "it seems hard to say that the plea was
entered with the advice of a constitutionally competent counsel-or that
it embodies a voluntary and intelligent decision to forsake constitutional
rights."' 185 However, the concurrence advocated for a less demanding
standard, arguing that Strickland's test for ineffectiveness should only
apply to the extent that a noncitizen received incorrect advice. 8 6 The
majority responded to the concurrence's position by averring that counsel
should not be incentivized to "remain silent on matters of great
importance" such as "possible exile from this country and separation
from their families."' 187 Limiting the holding to affirmative misadvice, the
majority argued, "would deny a class of clients least able to represent
themselves the most
rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is
88
readily available." 1
In dissent, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas resolutely deemed
immigration consequences as collateral, likening them to consequences
such as losing the right to bear arms, the loss of professional licenses, or
the right to vote. 8 9 The Justices averred that these are issues that
historically and necessarily have been far outside the counseling
responsibilities of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 190 The
182. Id at 380 (Alito, J., concurring).
183. Id at 388 (Alito, J., concurring).
184. Id.at 385 (Alito, J., concurring).
185.

Id.

186. Id.at 384, 388 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
187. Id.at 370 (majority opinion).
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 369, 370-71.
Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 369 (majority opinion); id.at 389 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused "legal advice directly related to
defense against prosecution of the charged offense," which the dissent
argued does not include advice related to the collateral consequences of
a conviction as it has "no logical stopping-point. 19 1 The dissent
discerned that the concurrence in particular seemed to be improperly
driven by an implied concern about the voluntariness of the plea, and
contended that such a concern "properly relates to the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to the Sixth
Amendment."' 92 Observing that Jose Padilla himself had not made any
argument that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, the dissent
chastised this apparent attempt by the other Justices to "smuggle the
claim into the Sixth Amendment. ' '
B. Strickland v. Washington and Due Process
For many, Padillarepresented a bold and much-needed expansion of
reasonable notions of attorney competence, but for others (such as Justice
Scalia) the majority had used "a sledge where a tack hammer [was]
needed." '1 94 A closer inspection of the rationale undergirding Strickland
and Supreme Court jurisprudence on the right to counsel reveals that
Scalia's allegation that the concurrence's rationale indicated that the issue
really was an attempted due process claim in disguise was not entirely
misplaced. But even if Scalia's assertion is true, the majority did not
interpretive commitments" in right-todisregard the Court's "former
95
counsel jurisprudence. 1
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "has never been fully
independent from due process ideas, especially when applied to the
states."' 96 The Court has long considered the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as interdependent and steered by the same essential
principles. 197 In particular, the concept of fairness is so firmly embedded
in right-to-counsel jurisprudence that a Sixth Amendment claim cannot
avoid a Fifth Amendment inquiry. 198 For example, in holding that a valid
plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the Supreme Court in
Brady v. United States in 1970 framed the matter as a Fifth Amendment
question that required a consideration of "all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding it," including whether the defendant was
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.at
Id. at
ld at
Id.at

389-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
391-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
388.

195. Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A
Response to ProfessorBibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 60 (2011).

196.

Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1470.

197.

See id at 1470-71.

198.

Id.
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"advised by competent counsel."' 99 The rule in Brady acknowledging the
importance of counsel in determining whether Fifth Amendment
principles have been compromised traces back to the Supreme Court's
1963 mandate in Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent defendants have a
right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment because "any
person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 20 0 The
fundamental Sixth Amendment right identified in Gideon is made
obligatory on the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as is the Sixth Amendment holding in Padillaregarding the
effectiveness of counsel.20 '
The rule in Strickland, technically a Sixth Amendment decision, "is
fundamentally a client-focused doctrine intended to ensure that the
adversarial criminal process is fair to the defendant., 20 2 The Strickland
Court observed that previously it had recognized, many times over, that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "exists, and is needed, in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,'' 20 3 which in turn is
guaranteed by the due process clause. In particular, the Strickland Court
explained: "the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation,
20 4
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system."
The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a "fair
trial.' '20 5 The Court explained that "[t]he Constitution guarantees a fair
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause ....206
In articulating the two-prong standard for effective assistance of
counsel in 1984, the Strickland Court examined its 1932 decision in
Powell v. Alabama, where it had tackled the issue of appointment of
counsel in capital cases. 20 7 The question before the Powell Court was
whether the denial of counsel in that case was so substantive that it
"infringe[d] the due process clause." 20 8 In arriving at the conclusion that
the defendants' attorneys were so hapless that due process rights had been
violated, the Court noted its own previous observations that the right to
be heard "would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
199.
200.
201.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-49, 754, 756 (1970).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added).
Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1470-71.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Nash, supra note 69, at 571 (emphasis added).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) (emphasis added).
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
Id.(emphasis added).
Id.at 684-85 (emphasis added).
Id.(emphasis added).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
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the right to be heard by counsel," explaining:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. . . .He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [has]
hand of counsel at every step
a perfect one. He requires the guiding
20 9
in the proceedings against him.
Without counsel, the Court recognized in 1932, even an intelligent
juvenile faces wrongful conviction "because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." 2 10 Thus,
[i]f in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutionalsense.2 11
The Court in Strickland also cited its 1938 decision in Johnson v.
Zerbst, addressing the validity of a waiver of the right to counsel in a
criminal matter, wherein it had opined that the "safeguards" of the Sixth
Amendment are "necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life
and liberty" and that the Sixth Amendment "stands as a constant
admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice
will 'still not be done."' 2 12 In Johnson, the Court had elaborated on the
importance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in preserving one's
"life or liberty": "[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
the prosecution is
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein
2 13
counsel.
learned
and
experienced
by
presented
Finally, the Strickland Court also visited its 1942 holding in Adams v.
UnitedStates ex rel McCann, another early right to counsel case:
The accused must have ample opportunity to meet the case of the
prosecution. To that end, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
abolished the rigors of the common law by affording one charged
with crime the assistance of counsel for his defense. Such
assistance "in the particular situation" of "ignorant defendants in a
209. Id.at 68-69.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at69.
Id. (emphasis added).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63 (emphasis added).
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capital case" led to recognition that "the benefit of counsel was
essential to the substance of a hearing", as guaranteedby the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in criminal
2 14
prosecutions in the state courts.
In Adams, the Court had commented that "[t]he relation of trial by jury
to civil rights - especially in criminal cases - is fully revealed by the

history which gave rise to the provisions of the Constitution which
guarantee that right," remarking that the "procedural devices" contained
in the Bill of Rights were not written "as abstract rubrics in an elegant
code but in order to assure fairness andjustice before any person could
215
be deprived of 'life, liberty, or property."'
In the spirit of these decisions, Strickland stated that in setting the
standard for effective defense counsel it was guided by "its purpose-to
ensure a fair trial. 2 16 Strickland defined "afair trial [as] one in which
evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal
217
for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding."
According to Strickland, "access to counsel's skill and knowledge is
necessary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case
of the prosecution' to which they are entitled., 218 The defense attorney
thus plays "the role necessary to ensure that the trial isfair [because it] is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results." 219
Because counsel is a crucial part of "the adversarial system embodied in
the Sixth Amendment," a claim of ineffectiveness must show "whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result." 220 Importantly, Stricklanddoes not "exhaustively define the
obligations of counsel"-rather, the assistance must be "reasonable
considering all the circumstances. "221
With this body of precedent as the backdrop, the Padilla Court
concluded that the severity of deportation as a sanction and the increased
convergence of civil deportation law with the criminal system together
showed "how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that
he faces a risk of deportation., 222 After Padilla, the flexible limits of
effective assistance articulated by Strickland now encompass advice on
214.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added); Adams v. United States ex rel (1984);

McCann v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

McCann, 317 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
Strickland,466 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added).
Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 685-86.
Id.at 688.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010).
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immigration consequences, a holding that arguably implies that the Court
believed that without this advice, the outcome for Jose Padilla was unfair
or unjust-a result that Strickland had counseled must be avoided.2 2 3 In
this regard, although Padillaclearly cites the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as its foundational principle, the decision reverberates with
notions of due process (just as Scalia apparently suspected), and properly
so. 224 Time and again, in Powell, Johnson, Adams, Strickland, and most
recently (albeit silently) in Padilla,the Supreme Court has recognized
that effective assistance of counsel is a means by which the objectives of
due process-namely, life and liberty-are achieved. 225 Put another way,
because the Sixth Amendment is "necessary to insure fundamental rights
of life and liberty," the Sixth Amendment simply cannot be divorced from
the Fifth Amendment right to due process. 22 6 Thus, any alleged
smuggling of a Fifth Amendment claim into a Sixth Amendment
be supported soundly by existing Supreme Court
argument 2would
27
precedent.
IV. A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

The Padilla Court confirmed what many noncitizens have known for
years: that the immigration sanctions triggered by a noncitizen's
interaction with the criminal justice system have increased in frequency
and severity. 22 8 Each point of contact between a child and authorities in
juvenile delinquency proceedings potentially puts a noncitizen youth's
current and future immigration status in peril. For decades, the Supreme
Court has used the differences between adult and juvenile brains to justify
and enhance constitutional protections for offending juveniles in the
criminal sentencing context; yet, the rights afforded to noncitizen adults
the rights extended to noncitizen
in criminal proceedings have outpaced
229
children in juvenile proceedings.
Put simply, the Padilla decision gives noncitizens in adult criminal
223. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added).
224. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 373-74; Strickland,466 U.S. at 686; Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 276 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71-72 (1932).
226. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462.
227. For a discussion of the implicit challenges made by the Padilla Court and its
implications for the lack of constitutional right to counsel in civil immigration proceedings, see
KANSTROOM,

228.
229.

supra note 8, at 1481-83.

Padilla,559 U.S. at 373-74.
See Shaheed, supra note 46, at 907.
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proceedings a right to counsel on immigration consequences, but it does
not ensure that children in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings have
that same right.230 Neither Padillanor Strickland, the foundation upon
which Padillawas constructed, addressed delinquency cases at all. 23 1 In
fact, the Supreme Court has conspicuously avoided a Sixth Amendment
analysis in determining the extent of the constitutional protections in
juvenile proceedings, instead finding that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are governed by the Fifth Amendment right to due
process.23 2 But Gault's mandate that due process requires the
appointment of counsel in juvenile court cannot be used to close the gap
between the rights of a noncitizen child versus that of a noncitizen
adult. 233 Unlike Padilla, where the Court specifically noted that
"informed consideration of possible deportation" at the plea bargaining
stage "can only benefit the State and noncitizen defendants" by enabling
them to "reach agreements that that better satisfy the interests of both
parties," the Gault decision failed to address both immigration
consequences andthe right to counsel in the pre-adjudicatory phases like
plea negotiation.2 34 In particular, the Gault Court used deliberately
restrictive language, stating that its holding applied only to the
adjudicative phase, not to pre-adjudicatory or dispositional phases, of a
juvenile proceeding. 235 Further, an immigration proceeding is a matter
more remote from an adjudicative phase than the dispositional stage of
the same proceeding. Thus, the directives in Gault cannot fairly be
extended to create a right for juveniles analogous to the right for adults
2 3 6 In summary,
created by Padilla.
the law remains in a state of troubling
contradiction: noncitizen children are more vulnerable than their adult
counterparts to the devastating results regularly triggered by our
immigration laws.
Mercifully, existing federal precedent suggests that this gap could be
closed by the Court with little difficulty. As discussed in Part III, the
Supreme Court has long recognized an axiomatic relationship between
the right to a fair trial and the role of counsel. In particular, the precedent
undergirding Padilla shows that the rule in Padilla is sustained by the
same ideals of fairness upon which Gault was built, thereby furnishing a
foothold for the Court to find that basic principles of due process require
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Padilla,559 U.S. at 374.
Id. at 366; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540-45 (1971).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
Padilla,559 U.S. at 373; see Gault, 387 U.S. at 34-40.

235.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 30.

236. Compare Padilla,559 U.S. at 366 (describing the rights to adults regarding their right
to counsel), with Gault, 387 U.S. at 55 (describing the rights to juveniles regarding their right to
counsel).
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an analogue to Padillain the civil juvenile delinquency system. 23 7
Put another way, Gault supplies the basic premise: children are
entitled to due process of law in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 238 The
Court recognizes that "due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,"239 and this
flexibility allows it to respond appropriately to situations involving
vulnerable populations by adapting existing standards to fix untenable
situations. Furthermore, due process protections under the Fifth
Amendment "are universal in their application" and "appl[y] to all
'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their
240
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.,
An analysis of what due process specifically requires here necessitates
a consideration of what is at stake-an assessment similar to the one
241 Juvenile proceedings, like immigration proceedings,
made in Padilla.
are technically civil, but they are nonetheless highly punitive. Liberty, as
the Gault Court noted, is indeed an important right; however, as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, "[p]reserving the client's right
to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than
any potential jail sentence." 242 Unlike the varied assortment of potential
penalties in criminal and delinquency proceedings (e.g., length of
detention, mandatory treatment, reporting requirements, and other
possible punitive and rehabilitative probationary terms) outcomes in
immigration matters are of a distinctively binary nature. 243 The
immigration laws activated by a delinquency proceeding will set a
noncitizen on a path that will impact every aspect of her life going
forward-her relationships with her family, friends, and society at large,
her education and work experiences, and her cultural experiences. 244 As
Gault emphasized in the context of confinement, our system of law
should not tolerate "reaching a result of such tremendous consequences
237.
238.

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 30.

239.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

240. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001).
241. Padilla,559 U.S. at 364.
242. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)); INS
v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 322-23 (2001).
243. For a discussion of the evolution of immigration sanctions from including penalties

such as incarceration, fines, and hard labor, to a binary system of deportation/exclusion, as well
as a proposal for a system of graduated sanctions in immigration law, see Stumpf, supra note 94,
at 1683.
244. Id. For a discussion of the evolution of immigration sanctions from including penalties
such as incarceration, fines, and hard labor, to a binary system of deportation/exclusion, as well
as a proposal for a system of graduated sanctions in immigration law, see Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009).
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245
..without effective assistance of counsel.,
As the Supreme Court in Powell observed about the unrepresented
defendant, "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law, [and] lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one." 246 The Court readily conceded in Padillathat the law with
regard to the deportation and criminal systems can be incredibly difficult
to understand for even experienced lawyers, let alone an unrepresented
noncitizen who is part of a "class of clients least able to represent
themselves." 24 7 A child's status as a noncitizen likewise amplifies her
vulnerability in juvenile delinquency proceedings: noncitizen youth may
lack knowledge in American law and experience linguistic and cultural
barriers to interacting with the juvenile justice system, rendering her
unable to argue its interpretation or offer facts that would have made her
case and ultimately protect her from deportation. 24 8 Youth, as well as the
caregivers and other authority figures in their lives, may be altogether
ignorant of their immigration status and therefore uninformed with
respect to the attendant vulnerabilities of noncitizens. If the child's
parents are also immigrants, they too may be unfamiliar with the
American legal system, increasing the likelihood of their son or daughter
making a critical misstep during each phase of a juvenile delinquency
249
proceeding.
The rehabilitative paradigm under which the juvenile delinquency
court operates does not exist in immigration law; immigration laws are
generally applied to children on the same terms as to adults. 250 Although
a narrow line of administrative precedent offers an avenue of relief for
some juveniles with adjudications, the language of these decisions masks
a statutory analysis that is indefensibly theoretical in many situations,
ultimately undermining the very protections the cases set out to
establish. 25 1 Finally, the broad discretionary power granted to
immigration officials to deny an application for relief functions as an
additional required element, such that every single fact, and every
statement and decision a child makes during the juvenile delinquency
process could have serious consequences for immigration eligibility and
therefore the child's entire future.

245.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554).

246. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
247. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369, 371 (2010).
248. See generally THRONSON, supra note 4, at 239-40.
249. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 65.
250. See supra Part III; see also THRONSON, supra note 4, at 135-39.
251. See supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing the interplay between In re Devison,
22 1. & N. Dec. 1362, 1370 (B.I.A. 2000); In re M-U-, 2 1. & N. Dec. 92 (B.I.A. 1944); 18 U.S.C.
5032 (2010)).
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Just like an adult in criminal proceedings, under certain circumstances
a noncitizen child in juvenile delinquency proceedings faces "banishment
or exile" by operation of harsh immigration laws.2 12 But the harm that
may befall a child upon removal from the United States may be even more
devastating than that which an adult may face. For example, the
separation of a child from a parent or guardian by way of the child's
denial of admission or deportation may be an unavoidable
consequence.2 5 3 Banned from the United States and without a parent or
legal guardian, in the best of situations, the child may confront major
obstacles in life with respect to education, family relationships and
support network, and access to medical and other services; at worst, the
child faces foster care, orphan status, or even life on the streets. 254 One
damaging potential outcome of deportation is similar to that which the
Court in Gault anticipated as a result of detention: separation from
"mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates." 255 This separation would constrict a child's ability, to
rehabilitate and reintegrate successfully into society, contrary to the intent
of the early reformers of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Ultimately,
no consequence of a juvenile proceeding can change a child's life "as
drastically
as automatic forcible removal from the country in which one
256
resides."
Thus, the consequences of deportation are just as high as they were
with respect to the consequences ofjuvenile detentions in Gault.As Gault
maintained, a "juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense
and to prepare and submit it." 257 Juveniles cannot be expected to know
and comprehend risks that the Court did not even expect noncitizen adults
to know without "access to counsel's skill and knowledge." 258 In fact,
immigration law is so complex that the Padillamajority even reduced the
expectations of performance placed on attorneys, acknowledging that in
many situations in immigration law the precise impact is "unclear or
uncertain., 259 Noncitizen children cannot be expected to understand the
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 454 (2d Cir. 1986).
See Frankel, supra note 35, at 66.
Id.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
Joanna Rosenberg, Note, A Game Changer?The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the

CollateralConsequences Rule and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FOROHAM L. REV.
1407, 1441 (2013).
257. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.

258.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); see Michael Pinard, The

Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of
Adjudications,6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1121 (2006).

259.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
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immigration laws and forecast their long-term implications if neither a
noncitizen adult nor a licensed attorney is expected to do so.
Padilla recognized a defense lawyer's responsibility to "actively
negotiate and competently advise their clients on whether a bargain is
substantively desirable." 260 Although neither Gideon nor Gault ensured a
right to counsel at pre-judicial stages, the Court has applied the Sixth
Amendment's protections in the plea bargaining context, holding in
Lafler v. Cooper26 1 and Missouri v. Frye2 62 that ineffectiveness leading
defendants to reject plea bargains can satisfy both the performance and
prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington.263 As Justice Stevens'
majority opinion in Padilla noted, 95% of adult criminal convictions
result from guilty pleas. 264 Likewise, as noted in Part I of this Article,
case resolutions by guilty plea in juvenile cases are just as high.265 In light
of the foregoing, the right to counsel for noncitizen juveniles should be
at least as expansive as the rights extended to noncitizen adults.
Juvenile judges cannot fairly be held responsible for ensuring a
noncitizen child is informed of the unique dangers he may face as a result
of a juvenile proceeding. Juvenile courts carry a heavy caseload and
already bear great responsibility with respect to all children hauled before
them, citizens and noncitizens alike, many of whom face difficult and
dangerous situations at home and at school that the judge may be trying
to repair or otherwise appropriately address to the extent possible from
the bench.266 Moreover, judges are largely absent during the pleabargaining process, further necessitating that this duty rest upon the
shoulders of the child's counsel.267 Finally, in some juvenile courts, a
failure to ensure a right to counsel with respect to noncitizens may result
in a situation where the juvenile court system can be effectively
commandeered by immigration enforcement officials as a barrier-free
child deportation system that not only guts the juvenile court's
rehabilitative principles but ultimately yields disparate treatment between

260. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection,99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1142 (2012).

261. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).
262. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012).
263. Bibas, supra note 259, at 1142.
264. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
265. Cowden & McKee, supra note 47, at 639 (noting that "over 95 percent [of juveniles in
delinquency proceedings] confessed or pleaded guilty").
266. ABA INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING
TO ADJUDICATION, 3.3(A) (1980) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS] (Responsibilities of

the juvenile court judge with respect to plea agreements); see also Bibas, supra note 259, at 1142.
267. Bibas, supra note 259, at 1142. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 265, 3.3(A)
(regarding responsibilities of the juvenile court judge with respect to plea agreements); see also
Bibas, supra note 259, at 1142.
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268
citizen and noncitizen children in the juvenile court system.
Recognizing a due process right to counsel for noncitizens on the
immigration consequences of juvenile delinquency, and ensuring this
right is satisfied at an early stage of the proceedings, will ensure the
already overburdened juvenile courts are not shouldering more
responsibility than they can efficiently handle.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions with respect to juvenile
offenders align with the philosophy of the early reformers and thus should
influence the Court's approach in defining the responsibilities of counsel
to noncitizen children in delinquency proceedings. 269 Advances in brain
science demonstrate that fundamental differences exist between juvenile
and adult minds: a child's ability to understand complex laws and
regulations and make well-reasoned decisions regarding his or her actions
and legal cases is reduced as compared to that of their adult
counterparts. 270 Likewise, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated an
appreciation that children have diminished abilities to assess risks,
control impulses, and consider future consequences; the court also
recognizes that a youth lacks control over many major outside factors,
including her family and home situations, which contribute to dangerous
or dysfunctional situations. 271 The results of these studies, embraced by
the Supreme Court, reiterate the principal justification for the juvenile
court system: the developmental differences between adults and children
warrant a system that protects the child's ability to rehabilitate fully.
Extending our notions of due process to include a right to advice on
immigration consequences in juvenile proceedings would be a modest yet
much-needed upgrade to the rights of noncitizen children. The unique
attributes and limitations of both children and noncitizens in legal
proceedings, as well as the sustained and severe consequences of removal
from the United States, are matters that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
deemed critical considerations when it comes to extending other
constitutional protections. 272 Further, the rehabilitative philosophy of
juvenile justice reinforces the notion that children must have at least the
273
same rights as adults in order to successfully reintegrate into society.
268.

ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 36, at 4.

269. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Montgomery
(Jan 25, 2016)).
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Louisiana,577 U.S.
270. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller,

132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
271. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68;
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Marrus, supra note 7, at 113.

272.

See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68;

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010) (discussing

noncitizens and removal from United States).
273.
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Thus, the "particular situation" to be assessed in this due process inquiry
involves an exceptionally vulnerable population that may not
comprehend, for social and psychological reasons, that a juvenile
delinquency proceeding may mean not one, but two life-altering and
potentially ruinous actions by the state: detention and deportation. 274 The
possibly life-spanning effects of juvenile delinquency proceedings for
children make it gravely important for the Supreme Court to explicitly
rule on whether due process entitles youth to the right to counsel on the
immigration consequences of their juvenile proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Although most practitioners reflexively believe that a delinquency
proceeding is less punitive than an adult criminal proceeding, this is
simply not true with regard to its impact on young immigrants. 27 5 Yet, the
Supreme Court has never stated that children have a right to counsel on
the immigration consequences of their civil delinquency proceedings.
Because delinquency proceedings are civil matters governed by Fifth
Amendment principles of due process and fundamental fairness, the
Court's Sixth Amendment decision in Padilla v. Kentucky in 2010
extending the right to counsel on the immigration consequences of
criminal proceedings does not protect children in civil juvenile
delinquency matters. 2 76 Thus, noncitizen children have fewer clear
constitutional protections than their adult counterparts.
Fortunately, weaving together several threads of existing Supreme
Court precedent can close the unsettling gap created by this legal
inconsistency. First, the Supreme Court historically has conceived of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments as fluid and interdependent, essentially
maintaining that the "safeguards" of the Sixth Amendment are necessary
to ensure that the Fifth Amendment principles of fundamental fairness
and due process are met. Next, the Padillaopinion demonstrates that the
Supreme Court continues to recognize the increased complexity and
severity of our deportation laws as well as the vulnerability of noncitizens
as a class. Finally, in a series of decisions issued in matters involving
JUVENILE COURT 46-78 (1999) (discussing evolution of Chapter 2: The Juvenile Court and the

idea ofjuvenile rehabilitation within the criminal justice system).
274.

Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942).

275.

See A.B.A., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND

QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 6 (reprinted June 2002),
http://njdc.info/appointment-of-counselaccess-to-counsel/http://njdc.info/appointment-of-counse
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youth in the criminal sentencing process, the Court confirms its
increasingly compassionate perspective regarding the diminished
culpability and unique rehabilitative capacity of children. Together, these
decisions provide a strong foothold for the Court to establish a right to
counsel on the immigration consequences of juvenile delinquency based
on the Fifth Amendment right to due process, the constitutional principles
under which delinquency proceedings already operate.
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